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This paper assesses the diﬀerential impact of the local availability of
grammar schools on local employment depending on the openness of
a jurisdiction, measured by commuting costs. Commuting costs mat-
ter as they inﬂuence workers' reservation wage. While the reservation
wage depends on public good provision in jurisdictions with high com-
muting costs, it does not so in jurisdictions with low commuting costs as
workers' outside option is to commute and not to move away. We test
these predictions using local grammar school closures in East Germany
after 2000. In line with the predictions we ﬁnd that school closures
reduced employment only in jurisdictions with high commuting costs.
Reassuringly, house prices responded, however, similar in both types of
jurisdictions which rules out that diﬀerences in preferences are driving
our results.
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I. Introduction
In 2050 almost 70% of the world population will live in urban areas, up from 30%
in 1950 (United Nations (2014)). The driving force behind this trend is seen in
urban amenities (Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)) as well as agglomeration economies which
increase productivity and thus wages (Rice et al. (2006), Graham (2007), Graham
and Kim (2008), Melo et al. (2009)). While adjusting house prices mitigate the trend
in urbanization (e.g. Combes et al. (2012)), the centralization of public goods (for
which economies of scale are important) in rural areas  in response to the decline in
the population density  may re-enforce the urbanization trend. Our paper tests this
presumption by investigating the role of the local availability of grammar schools
for local employment in East Germany. Following recent literature (see, e.g., Monte
et al. (2018)), we pay particular attention to diﬀerences in commuting patterns
between jurisdictions when analyzing the employment eﬀects. Commuting goes
hand in hand with urbanization as agglomeration economies capitalize into housing
prices and thus increase the incentive to commute to metropolitan areas.
The paper starts by setting out a stylized theoretical model of local employ-
ment in a (small) rural town and a large city/metropolis. Town and city diﬀer
with respect to wages, public good provision and housing prices. Since we focus
in the empirical analysis on local grammar school closures in mid-sized towns, we
assume that changes in the town do not aﬀect the city. The local labor market
and the housing market are modeled as follows: The wage in the town results from
a bargaining between workers and employers and we assume that workers have no
bargaining power. Thus, the wage in the town equals workers' reservation wage.
Local employment is then determined by the aggregate labor demand for the given
wage. Housing prices are a function of housing supply and the wage income of the
residents in the town as well as their public good valuation.
We compare two settings: In the ﬁrst setting, we assume commuting costs bet-
ween town and city to be prohibitively high and thus workers in the town are not
able to commute. In this case, workers' reservation wage and, therefore, the wage
in the town depends negatively on public good provision in the town. This means
that a reduction in public good provision increases the wage and thereby decreases
employment. In the second setting, we assume commuting costs to be suﬃciently
low. This means workers' outside option is not longer to move to the city but to
commute to the city and to work there. In this case, workers' reservation wage only
depends on the wage in the city and the commuting costs. Changes in the public
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good provision have, therefore, no impact on the wage in the town and consequently
no impact on employment. A further prediction of our model is that house prices
change similar in jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs in response to a
change in public good provision if the labor demand elasticity is close to −1.
We test these theoretical predictions using grammar school closures in mid-sized
rural towns in East Germany between 1997 and 2008. Grammar schools are impor-
tant as pupils ﬁnishing grammar school obtain a university entrance degree. In 2014,
41% of all pupils in East Germany went to a grammar school.1 The school closures
we exploit for identiﬁcation were caused by three reasons. First, there was a sub-
stantial outﬂow of people to West Germany after the re-uniﬁcation. Overall, about
four million inhabitants (out of 16 million) moved to West Germany for at least some
time. As it was mostly the younger people moving, this had a direct eﬀect on the
number of pupils attending east German schools. Second, birthrates dropped after
the re-uniﬁcation due to economic uncertainty (see Chevalier and Marie (2014)).
Third, in the second half of the 1990s, there was a substantial migration from rural
to urban areas. Saxony-Anhalt, a mostly rural area, saw its population decrease by
more than 20% between 1993 and 2013 (after the initial east-west migration) and
had to close about 60% of all schools in rural areas during the process.
It is important to note that the ﬁnal decision to close a particular grammar
school was made by the (hosting) federal state. Although (hosting) counties as well
as municipalities have been involved in the decision process as they contribute to the
funding of schools, the federal states had the ﬁnal say as they are bearing the main
ﬁnancial burden and are in particular responsible for hiring and overseeing teachers
as well as providing general funds per student.2 According to anecdotal evidence
and interviews with municipality administrations, the school closures have been
announced up to two years in advance. Since we do not have the announcement
dates for all school closures, we use the year of the actual school closing in the
empirical analysis but do expect anticipation eﬀects.
To lessen concerns about (adjusting) school sizes, we focus in the empirical ana-
lysis on jurisdictions with only one grammar school that was closed during our
sample period and compare these jurisdictions to similar jurisdictions in which the
1https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/BildungForschungKultur/
Schulen/BroschuereSchulenBlick0110018169004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
2Counties are usually responsible for pupil transportation, youth welfare services and schools for
children with special needs and the hosting municipality is in charge of the school infrastructure
and maintaining school buildings, facilities and equipment.
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only grammar school continued to exist. For the average jurisdiction with a school
closure we do not ﬁnd evidence for a reduction in local employment. Splitting the
sample according to the cost of commuting (proxied by the distance to the next
highway and railway or the share of out-commuters) we identify clear evidence in
line with our theoretical predictions. In commuter towns employment is unchanged,
while in worker towns it is reduced by around 12% after four years.
To hedge against concerns that our results are driven by diﬀerences in preferences
for schooling or diﬀerences in the schools that have been closed, we also investigate
the impact of school closures on house prices using oﬀer price data. Reassuringly, we
ﬁnd that house prices dropped in all jurisdictions with a school closure by about 12%.
Thus the jurisdictions as well as the school closures are comparable. Moreover, the
similar response of employment and house prices is consistent with the predictions
of our stylized theoretical model.
Our paper contributes to several streams of literature: First, we add to the
literature that investigates the impact of public good provision on local employment.
Despite its' high relevance for local governments, the literature has so far mainly
focused on the impact of ﬁrm public goods such as universities (Bania et al. (1993))
or infrastructure (Redding et al. (2011), Duranton and Turner (2012), Moeller and
Zierer (2018)) on ﬁrm location and performance (e.g. productivity) or on the impact
of people public goods such as schools on individuals' location decision (Buettner
and Janeba (2016), Albouy and Lue (2015)). While it is indisputable that ﬁrms
employ people, decisions on the size of university funding or large infrastructure
projects are usually not in the hand of local governments. Further, it is not obvious
whether attracting people does lead to more local employment or whether attracted
people simply out-commute. Most closely related to our work are thus studies that
focus on people public goods and/or local employment as Moﬁdi and Stone (1990),
Dalenberg and Partridge (1995) and Gabe and Bell (2004).
Moﬁdi and Stone (1990) assess the impact of educational spending on manufac-
turing employment on the state level in the U.S. between 1962 and 1982 and ﬁnd
a positive impact. Dalenberg and Partridge (1995) study employment in 28 me-
tropolitan areas between 1966 and 1981 and ﬁnd a positive impact of educational
spending as well. Gabe and Bell (2004) use data on ﬁrm locations between 1993
and 1995 in Maine in the USA. They are able to distinguish between diﬀerent types
of educational spending on the municipality level and identify for some spending
categories such as school transport or administration negative and for others such
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as the availability of schools that oﬀer education to the twelfth grade a positive
impact on the the number of businesses that locate in a particular municipality.
The impact is, however, mainly identiﬁed using variation within counties as there
is not suﬃcient variation over time. We contribute to this literature by examining
the impact of the local availability of grammar schools on employment exploiting
variation over time. Our strategy is thus robust to time-invariant unobservables.
Second, we add to the literature on local labor markets (for a review see Moretti
(2011)). In a recent contribution Monte et al. (2018) highlight the role of com-
muting diﬀerences between jurisdictions for observed local employment elasticities.
The authors show that employment eﬀects in response to labor demand shocks are
increasing with jurisdictions' commuting openness as moving people is more costly
than moving goods. Their main measure of commuting openness is the share of
residents who work where they live, which is strongly correlated with our proxy for
commuting costs. We believe our paper adds an important dimension as it shows
that commuting openness may also have a downside for governments since public
goods directed to individuals cannot longer be used to stimulate employment in
jurisdictions with close links to other jurisdictions.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature that investigates whether the availability
of schools and school quality capitalizes into prices. A substantial part of this
literature is concerned with the capitalization of schools and school quality into
housing prices and ﬁnds a substantial impact (for a recent overview see, e.g., Black
and Machin (2011)). In contrast to most work, in which the reasonableness of the
estimates for school quality are hard to judge, our approach has the advantage that
it allows us to assess the plausibility of our estimates. More precisely, using our
estimates we are able to back out the additional costs for families due to the school
closures. Our paper speaks, however, also to the literature on the capitalization of
public goods into wages. The empirical literature is scare at best, mainly due to
data availability.3 One recent exception is Buettner and Janeba (2016). They show
that higher spending for theaters and thus lower ticket prices reduces the required
wage by high skilled workers in Germany. Our result are in line with their ﬁndings
as they suggest that also the local availability of grammar schools is capitalized
into wages (although not in all jurisdictions but only the ones with high commuting
3For example, while the data in Fuest et al. (2018) can in principle also be used to study the impact
of public goods on wages, this data can only be used with a special permission by the German
Federal Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately, we have not been granted such a special permission
yet.
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costs).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section II, we set
out a stylized theoretical model to motivate our empirical analysis. The empirical
strategies, the data and our results are presented in sections III and IV. Section V
concludes.
II. Theoretical Motivation
In this section, we outline a stylized theoretical model to understand the mechanism
at work. Our set up in mind is that there are many jurisdictions. For simplicity,
however, we model only two jurisdictions, a rural town (no subscript) and a large
metropolis (m). The latter is assumed to be suﬃciently large such that changes
in the town do not aﬀect the metropolis. In this sense, we believe that the large
metropolis can also be seen as the sum of all other jurisdictions.
We focus on two settings. In the ﬁrst setting, commuting between town and
metropolis is not possible due to high commuting costs. Thus, a worker can either
work and live in the town or work and live in the metropolis. In the second case,
we allow for commuting. We start with the non-commuting case.
There are N potential workers that supply one unit of labor and are willing
to live in the town.4 All workers maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility function over
consumption (C) and housing (H) (see equation (1)). We abstract from modeling
the goods market similar to Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) and assume that the
price index for good consumption is 1. We include local public good provision
in our model by assuming that workers maximize their utility over gross housing,
deﬁned as net housing (HN , housing consumption) times public good valuation
(v(g), with v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0), but pay only for their net housing (see equation
(2) for workers' budget constraint). The idea behind is that most public goods are
non-exclusive. Thus, workers always have access to the public goods but may incur
costs to do so, e.g., commuting costs to use the closest public swimming pool, the
closest playground or the closest higher education school. Since it is not possible to
buy these local public goods in the goods market, we believe that linking them to
housing is most appropriate. Intuitively this means that the value of net housing
increases with the value of the locally provided public goods.
4This means that these workers have a suﬃciently high preference for living in the town. While
this could be modeled explicitly as in Monte et al. (2018), we believe it would only complicate
the model without adding further insights as the main channel at work is the wage channel.
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U =
(
C
α
)α(
H
(1− α)
)(1−α)
(1)
s.t.
w = C + p
H
v(g)
(2)
For simplicity, we work in the following with workers' indirect utility function,
which is given by:
U˜ =
w v(g)(1−α)
p(1−α)
(3)
Three dimensions are important to workers: Wages (w), house prices (p) and
the value of the public good (v(g)). Public good provision is the policy tool we are
interested in and we assume, therefore, that it is exogenously determined. Wages
are set in a bargaining process between workers and (aggregate) employers. The
parties bargain over the public good valuation adjusted wage (w v(g)) since the
budget constraint (after re-arranging) does not depend on the gross but on the
adjusted wage.5 Based on the assumption that ﬁrms have all the bargaining power6,
the wage in the town equals workers' reservation wage. The wage in the town can
thus be obtained by equalizing the (exogenous) public good adjusted wage in the
metropolis (wmv(gm)) and in the town and solving the expression for the wage in
the town:
w =
wmv(gm)
v(g)
(4)
Local employment is given by aggregate labor demand for the given wage. We
assume that the labor demand elasticity equals −1. While this is at the lower end
of a recent study for Germany by Lichter et al. (2013), we believe it is still a good
5While there is evidence that wages adjust to changes in housing prices (see, for example, Winters
et al. (2009)), this does not mean that wages are set taking housing prices into account. More
realistic is that wages and housing prices are driven by common factors as, for example, public
good provision or employment (e.g. agglomeration economies).
6Relaxing this assumption does not aﬀect the model implications qualitatively. If workers' also
receive part of the proﬁts, the question is how strong they change in response to a change in
employment. If the proﬁt per worker decreases with employment and the impact on bargaining
strength is independent of employment, this would - in case of a reduction in public good provision
- predict a smaller increase in wages and thus a lower reduction in employment in jurisdictions
with high commuting costs.
6
approximation as East Germany is characterized by less manufacturing jobs (see,
for example, Kluge and Weber (2015)) and estimated labor demand elasticities are
larger for these type of jobs.7
L = w−1. (5)
From workers' utility maximization, we know that each worker spends (1 −
α) w v(g) for housing and that there are L residents in the town (as commuting
is not possible and thus population equals the number of employees). Using Q as
housing supply, housing prices are then given by:
p =
(1− α)wv(g)L
Q
(6)
Change in Public Good Provision: Non-Commuter Case
Based on this model set-up, we now derive the impact of a marginal change in
public good provision on housing prices, wages and employment. We start with the
impact on house prices. Since we will estimate all speciﬁcations in logs, we also
derive the predictions for the logarized variables. Replacing L in equation (6) with
equation (5) shows that wages and employment do not matter for housing prices.
Assuming housing supply to be ﬁxed, the ﬁrst order derivative of (ln) housing prices
with respect to public good provision is given by:
∂ln(p)
∂g
=
∂ln(v(g))
∂g
(7)
(ln) Housing prices change, therefore, one to one for a change in (ln) public good
valuation. (ln) Wages in contrast decrease one to one for an increase in (ln) public
good valuation:
∂ln(w)
d.g
= −∂ln(v(g))
∂g
(8)
Finally, the impact on employment has - based on our assumption of a labor
demand elasticity of −1 - the opposite sign to the change in wages.
∂ln(L)
∂g
=
∂ln(v(g))
∂g
(9)
7To the extent that the employment demand elasticity is smaller (larger) than 1 in absolute terms,
this would predict a smaller (larger) response in employment and in house prices.
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Change in Public Good Provision: Commuter Case
We now turn to the case where commuting is possible since worker-independent
commuting costs c are suﬃciently low. Allowing for commuting aﬀects workers'
outside option, which is now not longer to move away but to start commuting
(based on the assumption that wages are higher in the metropolis). Equalizing the
public good adjusted wage of workers and of commuters in the town and solving for
the wage in the town gives the wage in the town:
w =
wm
c
(10)
This equation reveals the most important diﬀerence to the non-commuting case.
Since wages are independent of public good provision in the commuting case, a
change in public good provision does not aﬀect wages and, therefore, also not em-
ployment.
House prices in the commuting case depend both on the number of workers and
commuters as well as on their respective wages and the public good valuations.
Since we assumed that there are N potential workers willing to live in the town,
the number of commuters is given by N − L. Further, they earn the same (net-of-
commuting cost) wage as the workers in the town (as the wage in the town equals
workers' reservation wage). Given that wages, and the population is unchanged, we
see that (ln) house prices changes  as in the non-commuter case  one to one for a
change in (ln) valuation of public good provision.
∂ln(p)
d.g
=
∂ln(v(g))
d.g
(11)
To sum up, based on a very stylized theoretical model, we expect that a re-
duction in public good provision reduces employment only in jurisdictions with
high-commuting costs as in these jurisdictions wages are a function of the locally
provided public goods. In jurisdictions with low-commuting costs, wages are inde-
pendent of public good provision. As wages remain unchanged, also local employ-
ment is not aﬀected. House prices change, however, in jurisdictions with high and
low commuting costs to the same extent in response to a change in public good
provision if the labor demand elasticity is close to −1 (which we believe to be a
realistic assumption for rural labor markets in Eastern Germany).
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III. Empirical Strategy and descriptive statistics
A. Local Employment
To identify the eﬀect of local grammar school closures on local employment we rely
on a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator (DiD). Thus, we compare jurisdictions
(municipalities) with and without the closure of their only grammar school before
and after the closing. Our baseline ﬁxed eﬀects estimation equation reads as follow:8
Yi,t = αi + β1TRi ∗ Closei,t + γXi,t + νt + λi + i,t (12)
Our dependent variable (Yi,t) is (ln) number of employed residents, which in-
cludes residents employed in the jurisdiction (residential employment) as well as
residents employed in other jurisdictions (out-commuters).9 We prefer using the
number of employed residents in the baseline speciﬁcation as also in high commu-
ting cost jurisdictions some worker still commute to close by towns or villages. In
additional speciﬁcations, we use, however, also a more precise measure for local
employment, namely (ln) residential employment.
Our treatment group (TRi) consists of all jurisdictions with one grammar school
in 1997 that was closed until 2008. The data for grammar schools is hand-collected
and cross-checked with the number of grammar schools available on the county level
for Germany. We focus on jurisdictions with one grammar school as we believe
this provides the most credible variation for our analysis. In total, we observe 38
towns that saw their only grammar school closed between 1997-2008 with roughly
6 school closures per year between 2002 and 2008. In principle, school closures
in cities with more than one grammar school could also be used if these closures
cause excess demand for grammar schools. However, we do not have information
on the number of students on the school level and thus are not able to account for
school size (changes).10 Since not all school closures happened in the same year, the
reform variable (Closei,t) is jurisdiction-speciﬁc and is one for all years for which
the jurisdiction had one higher secondary education school less. The geographical
8In a robustness analysis, we also estimate a Poisson model. Results are basically unchanged and
available upon request.
9The data for this variable comes from the German Federal Employment Agency.
10In fact, we observe 83 school closures in towns with more than one grammar school. Note, that
we also see a small number of school openings during the observation period. We do not use
those small set of observations, because it is mostly very small private grammar schools with a
limited number of pupils that have been opened.
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location of schools and school closures in East Germany is depicted in Figure (1).
The majority of school closures took place in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt.
Our control group consists of jurisdictions with one grammar school in 1997
which was open at least until 2008. We include only jurisdictions with one grammar
school to ensure that treatment and control group jurisdictions are comparable
in size without further sample restrictions. In our sample, jurisdictions with one
grammar school have between 500 and 30,000 inhabitants.
Figure 1: Schools in 1997 and School Closings between 1997 and 2008 in East-
Germany
(a) Schools > 0 (b) Closings
Notes: The left ﬁgure shows whether a jurisdiction in East Germany had at least one grammar
school in 1997 and the right ﬁgure shows in which jurisdictions in East Germany at least one
grammar school was closed between 1997 and 2008. The white area in the middle is Berlin and
is not included in the analysis. The darker lines show the borders of the federal states in East
Germany.
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Our set of control variables, captured in the matrix Xi,t includes (ln) population
in 1997 and (ln) area size, both interacted with year dummies, the local business tax
(which is set by the municipality) and (ln) number of higher education schools within
10km distance. Further, we include (ln) number of employed residents of jurisdiction
with a similar size (based on 1997 population quintiles) that are located in the same
state and (ln) population of jurisdictions with more than 30.000 inhabitants (in
1997) within 80km radius. With the inclusion of the latter two variables we aim to
control for a diﬀerential trend of municipalities related to their size and location with
respect to larger jurisdictions. Further, we account for municipality mergers that
happened during our sample period by including an indicator variable if a merger
took place in a particular year, interacted with state dummies.11 All variables stem
or are constructed based on data from Statistik Lokal, which is provided by the
Federal Statistical Oﬃce. The variables νt and λi in equation (12) represent time
and municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level.
To account for a potential diﬀerent impact of school closures on local employment
in jurisdictions with low and high commuting costs as predicted by our theoretical
framework, we construct an indicator variable (Ci) that is one for jurisdictions with
low commuting costs. Since commuting costs are not observed, we assume that
jurisdictions that are closer to a motorway (in 1997) or a railway station (in 1890)
than the median jurisdiction have low commuting costs. In a robustness test, we
follow Monte et al. (2018) and use the share of out-commuters in 1998 as the splitting
criteria.12 We prefer the ﬁrst measure as it is less likely to capture unobserved
heterogeneity between jurisdictions. The indicator variable is interacted with the
treatment and reform interaction (see equation (13)). To address the concern that
the additional interaction eﬀect simply captures heterogeneity between jurisdictions,
we also include interaction eﬀects between the commuting cost indicator variable
and the control variables in additional speciﬁcations (except for population and area
which are already interacted with year dummies). Finally, we also estimate a more
ﬂexible speciﬁcation which includes 5 leads and 4 lags for the DiD variables (with
11The results are not sensitive to this control variable. This may be not surprising given that
we account for the mergers when constructing the data set. More precisely, if two jurisdictions
merged in 2005, we treat them from 1997 as one jurisdiction using 1997 population weighted
variables. We interact the merger indicator variable with state dummies as mergers diﬀer between
states, e.g. some states incentivized voluntary mergers, others not.
12We use 1998 data as out-commuters are not observed for all jurisdictions in 1997. Further, we
do not have data on railways in 1997 and thus use the 1890 data.
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t + 3 as excluded baseline category) to inspect the validity of the common trend
assumption.
Yi,t = αi + β1TRi ∗ Closei,t + β2TRi ∗ Closei,t ∗ Ci + γXi,t + νt + λi + i,t (13)
Descriptive statistics for treatment and control group for 1997 are reported in
Table (1). The average control group jurisdiction is larger than the treatment group
jurisdiction, with respect to the population as well as the number of employed
residents. Comparing jurisdictions with respect to their commuting costs gives a
similar picture. Commuter towns are somewhat larger in terms of employed residents
as well as population.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Local Employment Sample for 1997.
Control Group Treatment Group
Commuting Costs High Low High Low
Employed Residents in 1000 4.44 4.93 3.17 3.62
(2.61) (2.54) (1.02) (1.42)
Population in 1000 12.04 13.32 8.67 9.87
(7.11) (7.25) (3.27) (4.64)
Area in km2 79.68 69.59 93.67 63.48
(79.90) (60.09) (66.77) (44.17)
# Schools (0− 10km) 0.25 0.51 0.05 0.73
(0.42) (0.67) (0.19) (0.62)
Local Business Tax in 100 Points 324 327 330 339
(37) (39) (42) (33)
Observations 42 166 14 24
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics for the local employment sam-
ple for treatment and control group with high and low commuting costs
in 1997. The treatment group includes jurisdictions in which the only
grammar school was closed between 1997 and 2008 and the control group
jurisdictions in which the only grammar school was not closed between
1997 and 2008. Jurisdictions have low commuting costs if they are closer
to a railway station or a motorway than the median jurisdiction. Employed
residents include residents that are employed in the jurisdiction (residen-
tial employees) as well as in other jurisdictions (out-commuters). Source:
Authors' calculations based on data from Federal Employment Agency and
Statistic Local, 1997− 2008.
B. House Prices
To strengthen our analysis of the impact of local grammar school closures on lo-
cal employment, we complement it by an investigation of the impact of grammar
school closures on house prices using the same strategy, namely a DiD estimator. If
jurisdictions are comparable and the nature of the school closures are the same in
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jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs (and the labor demand elasticity
is close to −1) we expect that house prices drop independent of the commuting
openness of a jurisdiction.
The data for the house price analysis stems from the Empirica AG and inclu-
des oﬀer price data for a wide range of objects from newspapers as well as online
ads covering the years 2004 to 2008.13 We merge municipality information to this
data set using information on the location of the properties. The following types of
properties are included in the analysis: single family homes, semi-detached houses,
and terraced houses. We focus on purchase oﬀers and not rental oﬀers as housing
markets in mid-sized towns in East Germany are mainly purchase markets. Alt-
hough the oﬀer price data has the potential disadvantage of selection driving the
results, we believe that this is addressed by our estimation strategy, which accounts
for municipality and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
As houses are usually sold with land, we use the natural logarithm of the overall
price as the dependent variable and control for the amount of land, the ﬂoor space
and the interaction between the two. In addition, our analysis controls for the type
of property (single house, detached or terraced house) as well as the condition of the
property (high quality, newly built, renovated, in need of renovation) and the avai-
lability of balcony, garage and basement. Although we have additional information
for some properties (e.g. location in the city, close to public transport or not, etc),
we decided not to use them as adverts diﬀer strongly regarding the non-essential
information included in the ad. Thus, we are concerned that additional property
characteristics would not increase the precision of the estimates but only cause a se-
lection bias. Besides the property controls, we also include the average construction
year of properties in the municipality (as it is missing for many properties) as well
as the same control variables as used in the analysis of local employment.
Descriptive statistics for the house price sample are shown in Table (2). A house
in the sample costs on average between 120,000 and 155,000 Euro and comes with
between 780 and 1,180 square meter of land and with between 133 to 140 square
meter of living space. The houses in the treatment group are substantially less
expensive (139 to 155 compared to 121 to 126 thousand Euro).
13Given that this is a private database, we drop properties with ﬂoorspace or amount of land in
the top and bottom 1% to ensure that outliers are not driving the results.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics House Price Sample for 2004 to 2008.
Control Treatment
Low High Low High
Commuting Costs High Low High Low
Price 139,513 155,585 126,882 121,188
(86,683) (97,155) (75,829) (66,180)
Amount of Land 906 779 1,182 787
(947) (746) (1,160) (713)
Living Space 137 136 140 133
(62) (57) (60) (52)
Single Family House 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.79
(0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.41)
Detached House 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
(0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32)
Terraced House 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09
(0.26) (0.28) (0.21) (0.29)
Balcony 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
Garage 0.56 0.53 0.56 0.53
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Basement 0.17 0.24 0.21 0.22
(0.37) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41)
High Quality 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09
(0.30) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29)
Renovated 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.18
(0.42) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
In Need of Renovation 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.19
(0.42) (0.40) (0.43) (0.39)
Newly Build 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07
(0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26)
Population in 1000 (1997) 14.41 15.72 8.57 11.98
(6.00) (6.83) (2.59) (4.68)
Area in km2 80.57 71.28 83.89 70.25
(63.65) (53.14) (43.10) (35.25)
# Schools (0− 10km) 0.37 1.68 0.05 1.33
(0.64) (2.98) (0.22) (1.24)
Local Business Tax Multiplier 334.11 338.65 348.24 354.36
(39.47) (40.68) (37.47) (31.26)
Property Tax Multiplier 340.63 362.34 362.35 372.88
(26.77) (41.91) (31.45) (38.99)
Observations 8,624 49,372 1,666 4,004
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics for the house price sample for tre-
atment and control group with high and low commuting costs for 2004 to
2008. The treatment group includes jurisdictions in which the only grammar
school was closed between 1998 and 2008 and the control group jurisdictions
in which the only grammar school was not closed between 1998 and 2008.
Jurisdictions have low commuting costs if they are closer to a railway station
or a motorway than the median jurisdictions. Source: Authors' calculati-
ons based on data from Federal Employment Agency, Statistic Local and
Empirica AG 1997− 2008.
14
IV. Results
A. Local Employment
In the following we present the results of our DiD strategy. We start with the results
using (ln) number of employed residents as the dependent variable (see Table (3)).
In the ﬁrst two columns we do not distinguish between jurisdictions with high and
low commuting costs and here do not ﬁnd any evidence that school closures aﬀect
local employment, neither when only controlling for jurisdictions' size (col. (1)) nor
with our full set of control variables (col. (2)). In col. (3) to (6) we include the addi-
tional interaction term between the DiD variable and the commuting costs indicator
variable. The results in these speciﬁcations, which diﬀer with respect to the inclu-
sion of additional control variables, are statistically and economically very similar
and in line with the theoretical predictions: School closures only reduce employment
in jurisdictions with high commuting costs but have no impact in jurisdictions with
low commuting costs. Quantitatively, the eﬀect size is substantial as it suggests that
the average jurisdictions with high commuting costs in which a grammar school was
closed looses between 6 and 8% of its employed residents.
Col. (3) to (6) diﬀer as follow: Col. (3) shows the baseline speciﬁcation with
our full set of control variables. From col. (4) onwards we additionally control for
state-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Starting in col. (5) we also add interaction eﬀects between
the commuting costs indicator variable and the control variables to assess whether
our variable of interest solely captures heterogeneity between jurisdictions. This
is, however, not the case. Finally, in col. (6) we address the fact that there are
substantially more schools in neighboring jurisdictions of commuter jurisdictions
(see Table (1)). This could bias our results if the additional commute due to the
school closure is less in commuter jurisdictions. Thus, we include interactions eﬀects
of the DiD variables with the number of schools in neighboring jurisdiction. While
the point estimates for our variables of interest changes little, an interesting eﬀect
emerges. In worker towns, a higher number of grammar schools in neighboring
jurisdictions does mitigate the negative impact on employment. This relationship
is, however, absent for jurisdictions with a low commuting costs.
Since the validity of the DiD approach is based on the common trend assumption,
we investigate this now in detail by estimating a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation, which
includes ﬁve leads and four lags. The excluded baseline category is t + 3 as school
closures have been announced up to 2 years in advance. The point estimates are
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Local Employment
Dependent Variable: (ln) Employed Residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TR X Close -0.019 -0.022 -0.087*** -0.079*** -0.065*** -0.071***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
TR X Close X Low Commuting Costs (LCC) 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.071** 0.052*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
TR X Close X (ln) # Schools (0− 10km) 0.077***
(0.026)
TR X Close X (ln) # Schools (0− 10km) X LCC -0.060**
(0.030)
(ln) # Schools (0− 10km) -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 0.128*** 0.127***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
(ln) # Schools (0− 10km) X LCC -0.157*** -0.160***
(0.035) (0.035)
(ln) Local Business Tax 0.035 0.042 0.013 -0.050 -0.048
(0.055) (0.055) (0.051) (0.115) (0.116)
(ln) Local Business Tax X LCC 0.076 0.076
(0.125) (0.125)
Observations 2,653 2,653 2,653 2,653 2,653 2,653
R2 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.68
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X
(ln) Population (1997) X Year X X X X X X
(ln) Area X Year X X X X X X
Control Variables X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X
Control Variables X LCC X X
Notes: Table shows regression result for the impact of grammar school closures in jurisdictions with high and low
commuting costs on (ln) employed residents. TR is an indicator variable that is one if a jurisdiction experienced a school
closure between 1997 and 2008. Close is an indicator variable that is one if the jurisdiction has a grammar school less
compared to 1997. LCC is an indicator variable that is one if a jurisdiction has low commuting costs. Jurisdictions have
low commuting costs if they are closer to a railway station or a motorway than the median jurisdictions. In col. (1) and
(2) we do not distinguish between treated jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs but do so in col. (3) to (6).
In col. (1) we only control for jurisdiction size and from col. (2) onwards we use our full set of control variables. From
col. (4) onwards we additionally include state-year ﬁxed eﬀects and from col. (5) onwards also interaction eﬀects between
the control variables and the low commuting cost indicator variable. In col. (6) we additionally control for a diﬀerential
treatment eﬀect depending on how many schools are in neighboring jurisdictions. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Source: Authors'
calculations based on data from Federal Employment Agency and Statistic Local 1997-2008.
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illustrated on the left hand side of Figure (2). Reassuringly, the point estimates for
the leads suggests a common trend before the school closures. Moreover, the point
estimates for the lags show that the treatment eﬀect is increasing. More precisely,
our estimation results suggest that the number of employed residents is by around
12% lower 4 years after the school closure.
To rule out that the results are driven by the response of out-commuters, we
use in a robustness test (ln) residential employment, which includes only residents
employed in the jurisdiction. The point estimate for this speciﬁcation are shown on
the right hand side of Figure (2). The pattern of the point estimates is very similar:
While there is a common trend before the school closures, residential employment
decreases only in jurisdictions with high commuting costs. The main diﬀerence
between using employed residents vs residential employment is that the eﬀect size is
somewhat larger for the latter and suggests a reduction in residential employment
by around 15% 4 years after the school closure.
Figure 2: Estimation Results for Leads and Lags using Employed Residents and
Residential Employment as Dependent Variable
(a) (ln) Employed Residents (b) (ln) Residential Employment
Notes: The ﬁgures depict the point estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals using a regression
with ﬁve leads and four lags of the DiD variables for the school closures and the same control
variables as in col. (5) in Table (3). The dependent variable in the left ﬁgure is (ln) number of
employed residents (residents employed in the jurisdiction or elsewhere) and in the right ﬁgure (ln)
residential employment (residents employed in the jurisdiction). HCC stands for high commuting
costs jurisdictions and LCC for low commuting cost jurisdictions. A jurisdiction has low commuting
costs if it is closer to a motorway or a railway station than the median jurisdiction. Source:
Authors' calculations based on data from Federal Employment Agency and Statistic Local 1997-
2008.
In another robustness check, we use (ln) working age population (population aged
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between 20 and 65 years) as dependent variable. The point estimates are shown on
the left hand side of Figure (3). While the general pattern is again very similar,
two aspects are worth mentioning. First, there is some evidence that the working
age population decreases also in treated jurisdictions with high-commuting costs but
this eﬀect is only temporary. One potential explanation for this is sorting of families.
While some families dislike commuting and thus prefer moving away, others' don't
mind and thus move into the jurisdiction. Since the eﬀect sizes are still very diﬀerent
between jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs, we believe that this ﬁnding
does not contradict the intuition outlined in the model. Second, the eﬀect size is
slightly smaller compared to using all employed residents as dependent variable (-10
compared to -12%). This suggests that not all workers that loose their jobs move
away. To inspect this further, we use the unemployment rate in the jurisdiction as
dependent variable (see right hand side of Figure (3)). While there is no evidence
for a change in the unemployment rate in low commuting cost jurisdictions, the
unemployment rate increases after the school closures in jurisdictions with high
commuting costs. The results suggest that around 83% of the workers that lost their
jobs move away and 17% of the worker stay in the jurisdiction but are unemployed.
In the last sensitivity check, we assess whether our proxy for commuting costs dri-
ves the results. Thus, we run the same regression using the share of out-commuters
to group jurisdictions together with low and high commuting costs. The left hand
side of Figure (4) shows the results using (ln) number of employed residents and the
right hand side of Figure (4) using (ln) working age population as dependent vari-
able. The patterns are again very similar. Thus, we conclude that local grammar
school closures reduce local employment only in jurisdictions with high commuting
costs.
B. Housing Prices
The result for the impact of grammar school closures on house prices are reported in
Table (4). Following the theoretical framework, we expect that house prices should
drop to a similar extent in treated jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs
if the jurisdictions as well as the school closures are comparable.
In the ﬁrst two columns, we do not distinguish between jurisdictions with low
and high commuting costs. To address the fact that housing markets are forward
looking we include, however, two leads.14 While the treatment eﬀect in t+2 is
14Since we only have four years and account for municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, we refrain from using
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Figure 3: Estimation Results for Leads and Lags using Working Age Population
and Unemployment Rate as Dependent Variable
(a) (ln) Working Age Population (b) Unemployment Rate
Notes: The ﬁgures depict point estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals using a regression with ﬁve
leads and four lags of the DiD variables for the school closures and the same control variables as
in col. (5) in Table (3). The dependent variable in the left ﬁgure is (ln) working age population
(residents aged between 20 and 65 years) and in the right ﬁgure the unemployment rate (unem-
ployed over working age population). HCC stands for high commuting costs jurisdictions and LCC
for low commuting cost jurisdictions. A jurisdiction has low commuting costs if it is closer to a
motorway or a railway station than the median jurisdiction. Source: Authors' calculations based
on data from Federal Employment Agency and Statistic Local 1997− 2008.
close to zero and insigniﬁcant, the treatment eﬀect for t+1 and t is negative and
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus, house prices respond already in
expectation to the school closure, which is consistent with the fact that the school
closures have been announced up to 2 years in advance. From col. (3) onwards
we include the interaction eﬀect between treatment and reform interaction and the
commuting cost indicator variable. The point estimates for the interaction eﬀects
are small and insigniﬁcant. This suggests that house prices dropped in jurisdictions
with low and high commuting costs to a similar extent and thus that the jurisdictions
as well as the school closures are comparable. In col. (4) we include in addition
state-year ﬁxed eﬀects, which has, however, almost no impact on the results. In
col. (5) we additionally control for interaction eﬀects between the control variables
and the commuting costs indicator variable, which also has almost no impact on the
results. Finally, in col. (6) we account for the fact that there are more schools in
more leads. In a sensitivity analysis, we included, however, also lags, which turn out to be close
to zero and insigniﬁcant. Thus, as expected the eﬀect takes place immediately and not with a
time lag as for employment.
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Figure 4: Estimation Results for Leads and Lags using Share of Out-Commuters to
Proxy Commuting Costs in a Jurisdiction
(a) (ln) Employed Residents (b) (ln) Working Age Population
Notes: The ﬁgures depict the point estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals using a regression with
ﬁve leads and four lags of the DiD variables for the school closures and the same control variables
as in col. (5) in Table (3). The dependent variable in the left ﬁgure is (ln) number of employed
residents and in the right ﬁgure (ln) working age population. HCC stands for high commuting
costs jurisdictions and LCC for low commuting cost jurisdictions. The main diﬀerence to Figures
(2) and (3) is that jurisdictions are grouped into low and high commuting costs based on their
share of out-commuters in 1998 (using the median as threshold).
neighboring jurisdictions of low commuting cost jurisdictions, but again results are
unchanged.15
Quantitatively our results suggests that house prices dropped by around 12% if
a jurisdictions' only grammar school was closed. This is very similar to the change
in employment as predicted by our theoretical model. Given that the reduction in
house prices should reﬂect the costs of the additional commute caused by the school
closure, we can back out the additional cost using out estimates. The average house
price in treated jurisdictions is 122,000 Euro, which suggests an absolute house price
drop of around 14.000 Euro. Given that pupils go on average 200 days for 8 years to
a grammar school, this suggest additional costs of 10 EURO per school day (using
a discount rate of 3%). Thus, if we believe that the additional commute is 0.5 hour
per day (and that the direct costs as, for example, for fuel are negligible) we would
15In another not reported robustness check we assess whether the point estimates are driven by
the estimation on the property level. Thus, we collapse the data to the municipality level and
re-estimate the speciﬁcation shown in col. (2). The point estimates for the treatment and reform
interaction in t+2, t+1 and t (p-value) are 0.00 (0.989), -0.054 (0.174) and -0.095 (0.066). Thus,
while they are somewhat smaller, they are otherwise very similar.
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derive at a hourly rate of 20 EURO, which seems very reasonable.
V. Conclusion
This article evaluates the importance of local schools for a jurisdictions' economy.
Motivated by a stylized theoretical model, we investigate empirically the potentially
diﬀerential impact of public good provision on local employment depending on the
openness of a jurisdiction. For identiﬁcation we focus on school closures in East
Germany between 1997 and 2008 and employ a DiD estimator. We ﬁnd that local
grammar school closures decrease the number of employed residents after four years
by roughly 12% in jurisdictions with high commuting costs but that there is no
impact on local employment in jurisdictions with low commuting costs. The reason
for the diﬀerential eﬀect is the diﬀerent impact of public good provision on wages.
While there is a negative relationship between public good provision and wages
in jurisdictions with high commuting costs, wages are independent of public good
provision in jurisdictions with low commuting costs as workers' outside option is
to commute and not to more away. Reassuringly, we also ﬁnd that house prices
dropped in jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs by around 12%. This
suggest that the diﬀerential impact of the school closures is indeed related to the
wage channel and not to diﬀerences in preferences or diﬀerences in the schools closed.
We believe our work has two important implications: First, our work shows that
public good provision (speciﬁcally schools) can be used in jurisdictions with high
commuting costs to stimulate employment. This is certainly good news, but also
means that if public good provision is more and more centralized in rural areas,
it will fortify the trend in urbanization. Second, we ﬁnd that commuting patterns
matter not only for local employment elasticities as highlighted in Monte et al.
(2018) but also for the impact of public good provision on employment. We believe
a particular important avenue for future research is to show explicitly the diﬀerential
capitalization of public good provision into wages depending on the commuting
openness of a jurisdiction.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for House Prices
Dependent Variable: (ln) House Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Close (t+2) -0.023 -0.015 -0.016 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010
(0.035) (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032)
Close (t+2) X Low Commuting Costs (LCC) 0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006
(0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.062)
Close (t+1) -0.073* -0.068* -0.084** -0.086** -0.089* -0.093*
(0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.043) (0.048) (0.054)
Close (t+1) X Low Commuting Costs (LCC) 0.024 0.016 0.022 0.026
(0.065) (0.066) (0.070) (0.074)
TR X Close -0.103** -0.109*** -0.120*** -0.133*** -0.139*** -0.129***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038) (0.041)
TR X Close X Low Commuting Costs (LCC) 0.018 0.009 0.021 0.007
(0.060) (0.055) (0.061) (0.082)
TR X (ln) # Schools (0− 10km) -0.065
(0.078)
TR X (ln) # Schools (0− 10km) X LCC 0.071
(0.093)
(ln) Property Tax -0.048 -0.048 -0.062 -0.056 -0.030
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.467)
(ln) Property Tax x LCC -0.026
(0.473)
(ln) Local Business Tax -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.486 0.475
(0.033) (0.033) (0.041) (0.464) (0.526)
(ln) Local Business Tax x LCC -0.489 -0.478
(0.466) (0.528)
(ln) # Schools (0− 10km) -0.005 -0.005 -0.020 -0.275*** -0.275***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.046) (0.050)
(ln) # Schools (0− 10km) X LCC 0.274*** 0.274***
(0.054) (0.060)
N 63,666 63,666 63,666 63,666 63,666 63,666
R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Property Controls X X X X X X
Municipality Fixed Eﬀects X X X X X X
(ln) Population (1997) X Year X X X X X X
(ln) Area X Year X X X X X X
Control Variables X X X X X
State X Year Fixed Eﬀects X X X
Control Variables X LCC X X
Notes: Table shows regression result for the impact of grammar school closure in jurisdictions with high and low
commuting costs on (ln) house prices. TR is an indicator variable that is one if a jurisdiction experienced a school
closure between 1997 and 2008. Close is an indicator variable that is one if the jurisdiction has a grammar school less
compared to 1997. LCC is an indicator variable that is one if a jurisdiction has low commuting costs. Jurisdictions have
low commuting costs if they are closer to a railway station or a motorway than the median jurisdictions. In col. (1)
and (2) we do not distinguish between treated jurisdictions with high and low commuting costs but do so in col. (3) to
(6). In col. (1) we only control for jurisdiction size and from col. (2) onwards we use our full set of control variables.
From col. (4) onwards we additionally include state-year ﬁxed eﬀects and from col. (5) onwards also interaction eﬀects
between the control variables and the low commuting cost indicator variable. In col. (6) we additionally control for a
diﬀerential treatment eﬀect depending on how many schools are in neighboring jurisdictions. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Source:
Authors' calculations based on data from Federal Employment Agency, Statistic Local and Empirica AG 2004− 2008.
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